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Events in Rwanda
1. The members of the Security Council are fully aware of the critical situation in
Rwanda following the crash of the plane at Kigali airport on 6 April 1994, which
caused the deaths of all those on board, including President Juvenal Habyarimana of
Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntayamira of Burundi. The cause of the crash cannot
be determined without a full investigation, which so far has not been feasible.
2. This tragic incident set off a torrent of widespread killings, mainly in Kigali but
also in other parts of the country. The violence appears to have both political and
ethnic dimensions. No reliable estimate of deaths has so far been available, but they
could possibly number tens of thousands.
3. Reliable: reports strongly indicate that the killings were started by unruly
members of the Presidential Guard, then spread quickly throughout the city. Despite
the best efforts of UNAMIR, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) security battalion
quartered at the National Development Council complex broke out and started to
engage Government troops, including elements of the Presidential Guard. RPF units
from the demilitarized zone also moved towards Kigali and joined the fighting.
Authority collapsed, the provisional Government disintegrated and some of its
members were killed in the violence. An interim Government was proclaimed on 8
April 1994, but could not establish authority, and on 12 April 1994, as fighting
between the armed forces and the RPF intensified, left the capital. Since then, the
Defence Minister and the high command of the Rwandese Government Forces
(RGF), whose leadership has recently changed, appear to be the only interlocutors
available on the Government side. The brutal murders by unruly RGF soldiers of the
Prime Minister, Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, of other members of the Government
and of 10 members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR were particularly
tragic consequences of the violence.
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Efforts by UNAMIR
4. In this situation, it became impossible for UNAMIR to continue the tasks
emanating from its mandate. Responding to the security and humanitarian crises,
UNAMIR, led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force
Commander, dedicated itself to the following efforts:
(a) Securing an agreement on a cease-fire, to be followed by political
negotiations between the two sides to restore the peace process under the Arusha
agreement;
(b) Protecting, as far as possible, United Nations civilian staff; 
(c) Protecting, as far as possible, other civilians, both foreign and
Rwandese nationals;
(d) Negotiating a truce with the two parties in order to enable the
evacuation of expatriates to take place;
(e) Assisting in the evacuation of non-Rwandese civilians, both United
Nations and non--United Nations, by providing escorts for convoys to
land borders and to the airport, and coordinating with Belgian and
French task forces sent for this purpose;
(f) Rescuing individuals and groups trapped in the fighting;
(g) Providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced
persons under the protection of UNAMIR.
5. The most urgent of those tasks was the first, the effort to secure a cease-fire
through contacts with representatives of the armed forces and the RPF, in the hope
that this would lead to political efforts to return to the peace process under the Arusha
agreement. The Security Council was kept fully informed of these efforts and other
developments on the ground. The decision by the Government of Belgium, following
the murder of its 10 soldiers in UNAMIR and threats to Belgian nationals, to withdraw
its battalion from UNAMIR introduced a new critical element into the deteriorating
situation. The Force Commander has been trying to obtain assurances from both
sides to declare the airport a neutral zone under UNAMIR's control. He initially
received such assurances, but before they could be formalized, RGF changed its
stand, leaving open the possibility that. the airport could become a combat zone.
6. The members of the Council are aware that, despite direct contacts between
the two sides under the auspices of UNAMIR on 15 April 1994, which gave some
hope for progress towards a cease-fire, the efforts of UNAMIR have so far been
fruitless. Both sides have adopted rigid positions, with RPF presenting preconditions
that RGF rejects. In this situation, I regretfully have concluded that there is no
prospect of a cease-fire being agreed upon in the coming days. Both the violence in
the streets and the fighting between RGF and RPF forces continue. This has brought
mortar attacks on concentrations of displaced civilians under UNAMIR protection.
UNAMIR headquarters also was hit on 19 April, although there were fortunately no
casualties.
7. The dedicated personnel of UNAMIR, who have performed courageously in
dangerous circumstances, cannot be left at risk indefinitely when there is no
possibility of their performing the tasks for which they were dispatched. With the
departure of the Belgian contingent and non-essential personnel from other
contingents, the reduced strength of military personnel in UNAMIR stood, on 20 April,
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at 1,.'515 (from 2,165) and Military Observers at 190 (from 321), for a total of 1,705
(from 2,486).
options proposed
8. The Council will recall that in response to its request I presented, on 14
April, two broad alternatives for dealing with this highly unstable and unpredictable
state of affairs in Rwanda. Both options were predicated on the establishment of a
cease-fire, without which it would be impossible for UNAMIR to continue to perform
its responsibilities under its present mandate.
9. The first option was to retain UNAMIR at a reduced strength (that is, without
the Belgian contingent) for a limited period of three or four weeks following the
cease-fire. The parties would have been required to reach agreement on the
restoration of the Arusha process within this period, in which case UNAMIR would
resume its role under its mandate. Otherwise, UNAMIR would be withdrawn in its
totality.
10. The second option, following the cease-fire, was to withdraw the bulk of
UNAMIR, leaving my Special Representative and the Force Commander in Kigali to
act as intermediaries for political negotiations for an indefinite period, subject to
review by the Security Council, rather than the limited period envisaged in the first
alternative. In order to ensure the security of this United Nations team, about 200 to
300 United Nations military personnel would also have remained in Kigali.'
11. The two options above were not mutually exclusive. If the efforts under the first
had failed to succeed by the end of the stipulated period, it would have been possible
to move to the second scenario, instead of withdrawing UNAMIR in its totality.
Observations
12. In the critical situation that continues to prevail, a decision must be reached on
whether, and if so, how, the United Nations will maintain its efforts to help a people
who have fallen into calamitous circumstances. I offer three alternatives for the
Council's consideration.
13. Alternative1 .The first alternative is predicated on the conclusion, described
above, that there is no realistic prospect of the two opposing forces agreeing on an
effective cease-fire in the immediate future. Without a cease-fire, combat between
them will continue and so will the lawlessness and the massacres of civilians. This
situation could only be changed by the immediate and massive reinforcement,of
UNAMIR and a change in its mandate so that it would be equipped and authorized to
coerce the opposing forces into a cease-fire, and to attempt to restore law and order
and put an end to the killings. This also would make possible the provision and
distribution of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian agencies and non-
governmental organizations not only in the capital, but in other parts of the country
where the population has been displaced or subjected to deprivation as a result of the
violence. Further, the restoration of stability in Rwanda would assist in preventing the
repercussions of the violence from spreading to neighboring countries and leading to
regional instability. This scenario would require several thousand additional troops and
UNAMIR may have to be given enforcement powers under chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations.
14.  In this connection, I should report that the Permanent Representative of
Rwanda to the United Nations called on me on 19 April with a plea to reinforce
UNAMIR to enable it to end the chaos in his country. In a telephone conversation on
20 April, President Museweni of Uganda urged that UNAMIR be reinforced and
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retained in Rwanda, and asked me to convey his request to the Security Council. He
added that he was attempting to arrange for troop contributions from countries in the
region, and that he personally was directing efforts to arrange a cease-fire between
RGF and RPF.
15. Alternative II. The second alternative would be an amended form of the second
option presented to the Security Council on 14 April. In this scenario, a small group
headed by the Force Commander, with necessary staff, would remain in Kigali to act
as intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement
on a cease-fire, this effort being maintained for a period of up to two weeks or longer,
should the Council so prefer. Additional tasks would include assistance in the
resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible in this situation.
UNAMIR has received assurances from both sides that they will cooperate in such
operations, though there can be no certainty that this will be done.
16. The team would require the support of an infantry company to provide
security, as well as a number of military observers to monitor the situation, apart from
civilian staff, the total being estimated at about 270. The remainder of UNAMIR
personnel would be withdrawn, but UNAMIR, as a mission, would continue to exist.
The Special Representative, with a small staff, would continue his efforts to resume
his role as intermediary in the political negotiations, with the aim of bringing back the
two sides to the Arusha peace process.
17. The arrangements outlined above could be terminated at any moment should it
appear that the parties were not cooperating at a political level, or if their activities
compromised the safety and security of the UNAMIR group in Kigali. 18. The parties
are being reminded that, although the United Nations system and humanitarian.
agencies already have geared up to provide humanitarian relief and assistance, only
a limited amount could be distributed in the scenario outlined above. A full relief effort
would be impossible without a cease-fire.
19. Alternative III. The third alternative, which I do not favour, would be the complete
withdrawal of UNAMIR. If the Security Council were to decide on this option, every
effort would be made by UNAMIR to obtain commitments from the two sides that they
would take measures to ensure the safety of civilians in the areas under their
respective control. However, in view of the extreme nature
